Corporations by Tompkins, Alan W. & O\u27Neil, Ted S.
SMU Law Review
Volume 49





Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in SMU Law Review by
an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation






I. INTRODUCTION ........................................ 821
II. JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENTS ........................... 822
A. PERSONAL LIABILITY OF OFFICERS, DIRECTORS, AND
SHAREHOLDERS ....................................... 822
1. Holloway v. Skinner ............................... 822
2. Ex Parte Chambers ................................ 824
3. Valley Mechanical Contractors, Inc. v. Gonzales ... 826
B. CORPORATE STATUS AFTER MERGER ................. 828
C. CORPORATE PROCEDURAL RIGHTS .................... 829
1. Disco Machine of Liberal Co. v. Payton ........... 829
2. State v. Empak, Inc ............................... 830
3. El T Mexican Restaurants, Inc. v. Bacon .......... 832
D. CONDUCT OF SHAREHOLDER MEETINGS ............... 833
III. LEGISLATIVE HIGHLIGHTS .......................... 835
I. INTRODUCTION
HERE were several interesting cases decided by Texas courts dur-
ing the Survey period.' These cases are organized into the general
categories of: (1) shareholder, director, and officer liability, (2)
corporate status after merger, (3) corporate procedural rights, and (4)
conduct of shareholder meetings. In addition, a bill amending several
provisions of the Texas Business Corporation Act ("TBCA") was favora-
bly considered by the Texas Legislature.2 Although the bill did not pass,
it is expected to pass early in the 1997 legislative session. A summary of
the most significant provisions of the bill is included in the final section of
this article.
* J.D., M.B.A., Southern Methodist University; C.P.A., Attorney at Law, Secore &
Waller, L.L.P., Dallas, Texas.
** J.D., Southern Methodist University; Attorney at Law, Jones, Day, Reavis &
Pogue, Dallas, Texas.
1. October 1, 1994 through September 30, 1995.
2. Letter from Curtis W. Huff, Chairman, Corporation Law Committee of the Busi-




A. PERSONAL LIABILITY OF OFFICERS, DIRECTORS, AND
SHAREHOLDERS
1. Holloway v. Skinner3
In one of the most significant Texas decisions of the year, the Texas
Supreme Court addressed whether Graham Holloway, the president, di-
rector, and largest shareholder of Holligan, Inc., could be held personally
liable in tort for causing the corporation to breach its contracts with Rick
Skinner. In 1981, Skinner contributed his Alvin Ord's sandwich shop
franchise business to Holligan, Inc. in return for a promissory note, a roy-
alty on the gross sales of the shops, and a management position with the
corporation. Holloway served as president of the corporation and held
forty percent of its common stock. During the next three years, Holligan
failed to pay some of the amounts due Skinner, and Skinner's relation-
ship with Holloway deteriorated. Skinner left his position with Holligan
in 1984; the corporation defaulted entirely on its obligations to him in
1985.
Skinner successfully sued Holligan for the amounts owed under the
contracts, but the corporation filed for bankruptcy before satisfying the
judgment. Skinner then sued Holloway, claiming that he had tortiously
interfered with the contracts by inducing the corporation's default. The
trial court rendered judgment in favor of Skinner on the tortious interfer-
ence claim. The Austin Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Hollo-
way was not immune from the claim of tortious interference and that he
had used his position to gain a personal benefit at the expense of the
corporation's creditors. 4
Citing Maxey v. Citizen's National Bank,5 the court stated the general
rule that a corporate officer who causes the corporation to breach a con-
tract cannot be held personally liable in tort if the decision was made in
good faith and in the best interests of the corporation.6 The court listed
the elements of a cause of action for tortious interference as: "(1) the
existence of a contract subject to interference, (2) the occurrence of an
act of interference that was willful and intentional, (3) the act was a prox-
imate cause of the plaintiff's damage, and (4) actual damage or loss oc-
curred."'7 Regarding the first element, the majority noted that "[w]hen
there is a complete identity of interests [between a corporation and its
stockholder], there can be no interference as a matter of law."' 8 The ma-
3. 898 S.W.2d 793 (Tex. 1995).
4. See Holloway v. Skinner, 860 S.W.2d 217 (Tex. App.-Austin 1993) (affirming trial
court decision in favor of Rick Skinner); John D. Jackson & Alan W. Tompkins, Annual
Survey of Texas Law: Corporations and Limited Liability Companies, 47 SMU L. Rev. 901,
915 (1994) [hereinafter Jackson & Tompkins] (discussing Holloway v. Skinner).
5. 507 S.W.2d 722 (Tex. 1974).
6. 898 S.W.2d at 795.
7. Id. at 795-96 (citing Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Reyna, 865 S.W.2d 925, 926 (Tex.
1993).
8. Id. at 797.
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jority held that the first element was satisfied, despite the "substantial
alignment" of Holloway's interests with those of the corporation, because
Holloway owned only forty percent of its stock. 9
The majority then held that in order to establish the second element
when the defendant is both a corporate officer and the breach-inducing
party, the plaintiff must prove that "the defendant acted in a fashion so
contrary to the corporation's best interests that his actions could only
have been motivated by personal interests."'10 The majority reasoned
that:
[T]he mere existence of a personal stake in the outcome, especially
when any personal benefit is derivative of the improved financial
condition of the corporation or consists of the continued entitlement
to draw a salary, cannot alone constitute proof that the defendant
committed an act of willful or intentional interference.... Were this
not the rule, virtually every failure to pay a corporate debt would
constitute a prima facie case of tortious interference against the cor-
porate officer who decided not to pay the debt.'1
In reviewing the facts, the majority noted that the corporation had severe
cash flow problems and current liabilities far in excess of current assets at
the time of the defaults. 12 The majority concluded that although Skinner
was required to prove "more than the fact that [Holloway] benefitted
from the breach," no evidence indicated that the breach was motivated
by Holloway's pursuit of his own interests.13 The decision of the Austin
Court of Appeals was reversed, and judgment was rendered that Skinner
take nothing.14
Justice Hecht, joined by Justice Owen, concurred in the judgment but
disagreed strongly with the majority's approach to concluding that Hollo-
way was not liable. His principle criticism was that the law should not
burden an agent with potential liability to third parties when the principal
is not dissatisfied with the agent's actions. His rationale is summarized in
the following quotation:
An agent who acts to better his own interests cannot be held liable
for tortious interference if his actions are also in his principal's best
interests.... The rule [adopted by the majority] allows a third party
to show that an agent's conduct was contrary to his principal's inter-
est, even if the principal asserts the opposite position .... [U]nder
the Court's rule, Skinner can argue that Holloway did not act in Hol-
ligan's best interests when Skinner does not share those interests and
when Holligan itself has no complaint .... 15
Justice Hecht wrote that the better rule, in the context of a contract be-
tween a third party and an agent's principal, is that the agent should be
9. Id
10. Id. at 796.
11. 898 S.W.2d at 796.
12. Id. at 798.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 799.
1996]
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held liable for tortious interference only if the agent has exceeded the
scope of his authority. 16 Hecht pointed out that Holloway would have
been better situated if he had personally guaranteed the corporation's
obligations to Skinner because he could have avoided $100,000 in puni-
tive damages. 17 He cited numerous cases to support his view that the
majority's rule is flawed and "prone to mischief," but ultimately con-
curred in the court's judgment.18
In a separate concurrence, Justice Enoch wrote that the majority was
trying to place a "square peg into a round hole" by focusing on the sec-
ond element of the tortious interference claim.19 His view, which was
shared by Justice Hecht, was that Holloway's authority to act on behalf of
the corporation was the decisive issue. Enoch wrote that "[u]nder the
first element of the tortious interference with contract cause of action,
there must be a contract that was subjected to interference. If the inter-
ferer is a party, then there was no contract subjected to interference be-
cause a party cannot interfere with himself."'20 Enoch reasoned that in
the case of a contract with a corporation, the plaintiff must establish that
the corporate officer should be treated as a stranger to the contract and
not as the contracting party. In other words, the plaintiff has the burden
of proving that the corporate agent acted outside his scope of authority.21
Enoch agreed that Skinner had presented no evidence establishing that
Holloway acted to serve his own interests to the detriment of the corpo-
ration, and concurred in the court's judgment.22
2. Ex Parte Chambers23
A leading contender for the 1995 "Miscarriage of Texas Justice
Award"24 was the Texas Supreme Court's decision in Ex Parte Chambers.
This case involved the issue of whether a corporation's sole officer, direc-
tor, and shareholder could properly be held in contempt of court for his
failure to cause the corporation to pay a contempt fine levied against it.
As the basis for the appeal, Franklin Delano Chambers sought a writ of
habeas corpus. The facts indicated that in early 1992, Chambers was em-
ployed by a business brokerage firm known as International Business Ex-
change Corporation ("Exchange"). Chambers left Exchange and, in
April of 1992, formed International Business Search, Inc. ("IBS") to op-
16. 898 S.W.2d at 798.
17. Id. at 800.
18. Id. at 803 (citing Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hosp. 710 P.2d 1025, 1043-44
(Ariz. 1985); Morriss v. Coleman Co., 738 P.2d 841 (Kan. 1987)).
19. Id. at 804.
20. Id.
21. 898 S.W.2d at 804.
22. Id.
23. 898 S.W.2d 257 (Tex. 1995).
24. This award was inspired by a passage from Justice Enoch's concurrence in Ex Parte
Chambers. See id. at 263. The award is dedicated to those who believe that even though
the procedural formalities of the law exist for our mutual benefit and protection, some-
times things just don't turn out right. See, e.g., People v. Orenthal James Simpson, Cause
No. BA097211, Super. Ct. for the State of California, County of Los Angeles.
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erate in direct competition with Exchange. IBS employed Chambers and
several other former Exchange employees. Exchange sued Chambers,
IBS, and the former Exchange employees for violating the non-disclosure
and non-competition agreements that they had signed while working for
Exchange. In mid-1992, Exchange obtained an injunction restraining the
defendants from using Exchange's trade secrets and confidential
information.
In early 1993, Chambers and the individual defendants were found in
contempt of court for violating the injunction. Small fines were imposed
and paid. Chambers then transferred all the assets of IBS to his new sole
proprietorship ("IBS II"). The proprietorship engaged in the same busi-
ness practices as IBS. In June of 1993, another contempt order was issued
against IBS alone, which by that time had no assets. The contempt order
against IBS required payment of a $3,000 fine within 10 days. At a hear-
ing approximately four months after the second contempt order was is-
sued, Chambers argued that IBS was unable to pay the fine. The court
found both Chambers and IBS to be in contempt, and ordered Chambers
to personally pay a $6,000 fine and spend seven days in jail. Chambers
sought a writ of habeas corpus, which the Third Court of Appeals
denied.2 5
The Texas Supreme Court granted Chamber's writ of habeas corpus
because Chambers established that IBS was unable to pay the fine.26 In
its analysis, the court focused on whether an officer, director and share-
holder can be held in contempt of court when the violated order is di-
rected only to the corporation. The court noted that for a corporate
agent to be charged with contempt, there must be evidence that the agent
was personally connected with defying the decree. 27 The court had no
difficulty finding that because Chambers controlled IBS, he had person-
ally participated in the violation and had notice of the contempt order.
Thus, the contempt order was held to be valid on those grounds.28 The
court found, however, that because IBS did not have sufficient assets to
pay the fine at any time after the second contempt order was entered, the
failure to pay by Chambers and IBS was involuntary.29 The court noted
that the involuntary inability to comply is a valid defense to criminal
contempt.30
Although Exchange argued that IBS was Chamber's alter ego and that
the fine should be paid out of Chamber's personal assets, the court took
Exchange to task for failing to allege the alter ego theory in its motion for
contempt.31 The court found that Chambers had no duty to preserve the
assets of IBS for the payment of fines "which hypothetically would be
25. Id. at 259.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 259-61.
28. 898 S.W.2d at 261.
29. Id at 261-62.




levied in the future. '32 The majority stated that it could not justify
Chambers' imprisonment when Exchange's motion for contempt did not
allege the alter ego theory, and granted the writ of habeas corpus.33 In
concurring in the judgment, Justice Enoch disagreed with the majority's
basic premise that a corporate agent could be held in contempt for the
violation of a contempt order directed only against the corporation.34 He
also chastised the trial court for its June, 1993 contempt judgment be-
cause it implicitly found that the corporation was Chambers' alter ego
without having provided him with adequate notice of the charges. 35
In dissent, Justice Raul Gonzalez correctly argued that the Court
should have refused to allow Chambers to "brazenly flout[ ] the orders of
the trial court [and make] a mockery of the judicial system. ' 36 He felt
that it was clear that Chambers had repeatedly violated the trial court's
injunctions and had only challenged the trial court after the issuance of
the second contempt order. 37 Gonzalez opined that IBS's inability to pay
was not involuntary because IBS had sufficient assets to pay the fine at
one time, and was unable to comply with the contempt order only be-
cause of Chamber's voluntary dissipation of the corporation's assets.38
Additionally, Gonzalez noted that piercing the corporate veil was not
necessary in order to hold Chambers personally liable because he was the
only person who could have caused IBS to pay its fine.39 Gonzalez rea-
soned that "[t]he power to hold parties in contempt and to sanction non-
compliance is an essential element of judicial independence and author-
ity," 40 and stated that he would have affirmed the trial court's judgment
of contempt. 41
3. Valley Mechanical Contractors, Inc. v. Gonzales42
In this case, the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals addressed whether
the alter ego and corporate disregard doctrines could be used to reach
corporate funds in order to satisfy the obligations of the corporation's
president. In 1988, attorney Ernesto Gonzales represented Isidora
Wabler in her divorce from David Wabler. The divorce decree ordered
Mr. Wabler to pay Gonzales $13,075 in attorney's fees. In 1991, while the
judgment was outstanding, Mr. Wabler formed Valley Mechanical Con-
tractors, Inc. ("VMC"). The corporation was purportedly formed for the
operation of a commercial air conditioning business. Wabler personally
paid the costs of incorporating VMC, appointed himself president, and
32. Id.
33. 898 S.W.2d at 266.
34. Id. at 262-63.
35. Id. at 263.
36. Id. at 263.
37. Id. at 263.
* 38. 898 S.W.2d at 266.
39. 898 S.W.2d at 267-68.
40. Id. at 267.
41. Id. at 269.
42. 894 S.W.2d 832 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1995, no writ).
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opened two corporate banks accounts on which he was the sole signatory.
Wabler made his brother, Raymond, the sole shareholder of VMC even
though Raymond paid no consideration for the shares.
Gonzales applied for a writ of garnishment against VMC's funds in
1993, alleging that VMC was Wabler's alter ego. Gonzales presented evi-
dence that VMC's bank accounts were not properly maintained and that
VMC made several payments to Wabler for which there was no adequate
documentation. Further, although Wabler testified that his VMC salary
was his only source of income, the evidence indicated that deposits to his
personal bank account far exceeded his salary. Finally, the evidence
showed that VMC had paid Wabler's home telephone bill. Based on the
record, the trial court found that VMC was Wabler's alter ego and or-
dered garnishment against VMC's bank accounts. 43 VMC appealed on
the grounds of evidentiary insufficiency.44
In affirming the judgment, the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals re-
viewed the operative differences between the Castleberry v. Branscum45
corporate disregard doctrine and the alter ego doctrine. Citing Castle-
berry, the court noted that Texas courts will disregard the corporate fic-
tion when it has been used as part of an unfair device to achieve an
inequitable result.46 The court stated that the third Castleberry circum-
stance justifying disregard of the corporate form-when it is used to
evade an existing legal obligation-was implicated in the case at hand.47
The court wrote that the alter ego doctrine is used to disregard the
corporate fiction when there is "such unity between a corporation and an
individual that an adherence to the fiction of a separate existence would
... sanction a fraud or promote an injustice." 4 An alter ego relationship
can be shown when: (1) corporate formalities have not been followed or
when corporate and personal property have been commingled, (2) an in-
dividual maintains an excessive financial interest, ownership, and control
over the entity, or (3) the corporation has been used for personal pur-
poses.49 The rationale is if shareholders disregard the corporate form, the
law will also disregard the form when necessary to protect corporate
creditors.50 Based on the evidence presented in the trial court, the court
of appeals held that Wabler had created VMC as a means of avoiding his
obligation to Gonzales, that he maintained total control over the corpora-
tion, and that the alter ego finding was proper.5' The trial court's judg-
ment was affirmed.5 2
43. Id. at 833-34.
44. Id. at 833.
45. 721 S.W.2d 270 (Tex. 1986).
46. 894 S.W.2d at 834.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 835.
50. Id.




B. CORPORATE STATUS AFTER MERGER
The Texas Supreme Court's 1995 decision in Bailey v. Vanscot Concrete
Co.5 3 marked the second time in two years that the court has dealt with
issues relating to the 1986 accident involving Wallace Bailey, Jr. and a
batch of contaminated concrete.5 4 In July of 1986, Vanscot Concrete
("Vanscot") merged into a corporation that subsequently changed its
name to Tarmac Texas, Inc. The appropriate filings were made in the
Texas Secretary of State's office to reflect the merger. Prior to the
merger, Vanscot conducted business under the assumed names of Express
Concrete Company ("Express") and Pennington Concrete Company
("Pennington"). Assumed name certificates were filed of record in Tar-
rant County. Three months after the merger, Bailey was injured by con-
crete from a truck bearing the name "Express/Pennington." Bailey sued
Vanscot after he learned that both Express and Pennington were assumed
names of Vanscot. Vanscot moved for summary judgment on the grounds
that it had ceased to exist, as a result of the merger, approximately three
months before the accident. The motion was denied, but Bailey made no
effort to join Tarmac as a party. The case went to trial, during which
Bailey amended his pleadings to name Vanscot d/b/a Express/Pennington
as defendant. The jury found for Bailey.
Bailey sought judgment against Tarmac in a post-verdict motion, but
the trial court rendered judgment only against Vanscot. On appeal, Van-
scot successfully argued that it was not liable to Bailey because its exist-
ence had ended three months before Bailey's accident, and that the real
party in interest-Tarmac-had never been joined as a party to the suit.
The Fort Worth Court of Appeals held that Vanscot was not a correct
party and dismissed the appeal. The Texas Supreme Court reversed the
dismissal, holding that a corporation may still appeal a trial court judg-
ment after the corporation has ceased to exist.55 The Supreme Court re-
manded the case to the Fort Worth Court of Appeals, which rendered
judgment that Bailey take nothing.
In his appeal, Bailey claimed that Vanscot continued to exist within
Tarmac for the purpose of legal liability. Citing Article 5.06(A)(1) of the
TBCA, the Supreme Court confirmed that Vanscot's actual and legal
existence had ended upon the merger.56 The court summarized the case
in a footnote: "This is not a successor liability case in which a corporation
commits a tort and thereafter either dissolves or merges. Rather, in Bai-
ley's case, the corporation merged and then allegedly committed a tort.
Therefore, Bailey was required to sue the corporation which injured
53. 894 S.W.2d 757 (Tex. 1995).
54. See Vanscot Concrete Co. v. Bailey, 853 S.W.2d 525 (Tex. 1993) (holding that a
corporation which has ceased to exist as a result of merger has the right to appeal a trial
court's judgment against it); Jackson & Tompkins, supra note 4, at 915 (discussing Vanscot
Concrete Co. v. Bailey).
55. 853 S.W.2d at 526.
56. 894 S.W.2d at 759.
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him-the post merger entity. '57
Bailey also argued that Vanscot could not assert a lack of existence
because it had failed to withdraw the assumed name certificates after the
merger. The court held that there was no authority for imposing tort lia-
bility on Vanscot because of a failure to withdraw misleading certificates,
and reasoned that the failure did not change the fact that Vanscot did not
exist on the date of the accident. 58 The court noted that Bailey should
have added Tarmac as a defendant after Vanscot identified it as the real
party in interest, and "decline[d] to correct Bailey's error by retroactively
substituting the correct party on his behalf.'' 59
C. CORPORATE PROCEDURAL RIGHTS
1. Disco Machine of Liberal Co. v. Payton60
This case dealt with the application of the statutory limitations period
of TBCA Article 2.22-161 to a preemptive rights violation. In August of
1985, while George Payton was a shareholder of Diversified Industrial
Service Company ("Diversified"), the corporation sold 355 shares to
Disco Machine of Liberal Company ("Disco"). After several attempts to
gain access to Diversified's books and records, Payton was permitted to
review the books in April of 1990. At that time, he discovered the corpo-
ration's sale of shares to Disco. In August of 1991, Payton filed suit
against the corporation and several other defendants in order to enforce
his preemptive rights. The defendants moved for summary judgment,
claiming that Payton's claim should have been brought within the four
years after the violation occurred-or by August of 1989. Payton based
his argument on Section C of TBCA Article 2.22-1, which became effec-
tive on August 28, 198962 and provides as follows:
An action may not be brought.., on account of any violation of any
preemptive right ... unless such action is brought within the earlier
of: (1) One year after the date on which written notice is given to
each shareholder whose preemptive right was violated ... which no-
tice shall ... inform the shareholder that the issuance, sale, or other
distribution... was in violation of the preemptive right of the share-
holder; and (2) Four years after the date on which the corporation
issued, sold, or otherwise distributed those shares or securities or the
effective date of this provision, whichever is later.63 (Emphasis added).
Because the statutory provision became effective in August of 1989, Pay-
ton argued that the limitations period for his claim ended in August of
1993 and, therefore, that his suit was timely filed. The trial court agreed
and granted summary judgment for Payton.
57. Id. at 759 n.1.
58. Id. at 759.
59. Id. at 761.
60. 900 S.W.2d 124 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1995, writ requested).





In affirming the trial court decision, the Amarillo Court of Appeals
held that the trial court's literal interpretation of the statutory language
was consistent with the Texas Legislature's intent to make an "otherwise
indefinite limitations period finite." 64 The appellate court noted that no
evidence indicated that Payton knew, or should have known, about Di-
versified's sale of shares to Disco,65 and that Payton had only found the
preemptive rights violation because he sought access to the corporate
records for valuation purposes.66 Amazingly, the appellants argued that
because Payton had been repeatedly (and possibly wrongly) denied ac-
cess to Diversified's records since as early as the mid-1970s, he had effec-
tively been put on notice about the preemptive rights violation.67 The
appellate court was not convinced, and overruled the appellant's point of
error.
68
2. State v. Empak, InC6 9
In this case, Houston's Fourteenth District Court of Appeals consid-
ered whether a Texas corporation has a right to a speedy trial under both
federal and state law. The opinion is significant because, as the case dem-
onstrates, a corporation's right to a speedy trial can have a serious impact
when regulatory enforcement actions are involved.
Empak operated a hazardous waste treatment facility in Harris
County. Its customers were major chemical companies who routinely re-
viewed Empak's environmental compliance status and requested infor-
mation about any pending criminal environmental actions against the
company. In 1990 and 1991, the Harris County Pollution Control Depart-
ment ("HCPCD") sent three notices of alleged water pollution violations
to Empak, and the company responded to each notice within ten days of
receipt. On April 29, 1991, Empak was charged with misdemeanor of-
fenses of water pollution. It was not until over two years later, however,
(on August 10, 1993) that Empak was served with a summons. Prior to
the arraignment, Empak moved to dismiss the action based on the State's
violation of Empak's right to a speedy trial under the United States and
Texas Constitutions.
At the hearing on the motion to dismiss, Empak officials testified that
despite the notices of violation, Empak had not disclosed to potential cus-
tomers that it was subject to any ongoing environmental enforcement ac-
tions. Empak explained that this was because most violation notices did
not result in enforcement action, and that during the long period between
the violation notice and the summons, HCPCD gave no indication that
Empak would be subject to any enforcement action.70 Further, Empak
64. 900 S.W.2d at 126.




69. 889 S.W.2d 618 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist] 1994, no writ).
70. Id. at 621.
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had closed its files concerning the alleged violations because of the lapse
of time.71 The State offered no testimony or opposition to the motion to
dismiss, and the trial court granted the motion.
In reviewing the trial court's decision, the appellate court noted that
under both the state and federal constitutions, an accused is entitled to a
speedy public trial. 72 While state and federal rights are independent,
Texas courts generally look to federal courts to determine state constitu-
tional rights. 73 While the State argued that the right to a speedy trial was
"purely personal" to an individual citizen, the court found that "a corpo-
ration faced with pending criminal charges is vulnerable to many of the
interests that have been recognized historically as being protected by the
speedy trial right . . . . 74 These interests include being forced to exist
under a cloud of anxiety and suspicion as well as the loss of customers
and goodwill. In examining the issue, the court found that numerous fed-
eral courts and courts in other states had determined that a corporate
defendant was entitled to a speedy trial.75 After discussing the logic of
cases inside and outside the jurisdiction, the court concluded that corpo-
rations have a right to a speedy trial under the federal and state constitu-
tions as well as the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.76 Based on this
finding, the court was required to determine whether Empak's right to a
speedy trial had been violated.77
In reviewing the facts, the appellate court found that the delay was not
justified, particularly because the State had offered no evidence for the
delay and because the charges could have adversely affected Empak's
business.78 While the court stated that the analysis of whether a defend-
ant's right to a speedy trial had been violated is often difficult, the twenty-
eight month delay by the State in this case was unreasonable. 79 Had the
State offered some viable reason for the delay, the court's determination
may have been different. Regardless of that fact, Empak confirms that
Texas corporations have the right to a speedy trial when a criminal en-
forcement action is involved.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id., (citing Harris v. State, 827 S.W.2d 949, 956 (Tex. Crim. App.) (en banc), cert.
denied, 113 S.Ct. 381 (1992)).
74. 889 S.W.2d at 622.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 623; see TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 1.05 (Vernon 1977).
77. Id.; see also Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 531 (1972) (applying a balancing test to
determine whether a defendant has been denied his right to a speedy trial). Under the
Barker balancing test, the court reviews: (1) the length of the delay, (2) the government's
justification for the delay, (3) whether the accused asserted his right to a speedy trial, and(4) prejudice to the accused caused by the delay. Id.
78. 889 S.W.2d at 623-24.
79. Id. at 625.
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3. El T Mexican Restaurants, Inc. v. Bacon80
Houston's First District Court of Appeals addressed the issues of cor-
porate standing, capacity, and the right to sue in Texas courts in El T.
The case centered around J. Roland Bacon, an insurance agent who in-
corporated his insurance business and became the sole shareholder of J.
Roland Bacon, Inc. ("JRBI"). In 1981, El T. Mexican Restaurants, Inc.
("ET") entered into an agreement with JRBI for the purchase of insur-
ance. As part of the agreement, JRBI paid for the insurance and billed
ET. When ET failed to pay the amounts due, JRBI sued. During the
litigation, an issue was raised regarding JRBI's corporate status.
In 1984, Bacon decided to cease doing business as a corporation and
stopped paying corporate franchise taxes. As a result, the Texas Secre-
tary of State forfeited JRBI's corporate charter. Bacon did not, however,
dissolve the corporation. Bacon claimed that the cause of action accrued
in 1983, when ET failed to pay its debt. He filed suit on behalf of JRBI in
1985. In 1990, Bacon amended his pleadings to delete JRBI and desig-
nate himself as successor in interest to the corporation's cause of action.
ET sought a directed verdict at trial on the basis that Bacon had no right
to recover on the corporation's claim. The motion was denied.
On appeal, ET asserted that Bacon had no right to recover as a share-
holder on JRBI's cause of action and that JRBI's suit was void because it
lacked the capacity to file suit.81 Bacon argued that he was the successor
in interest to JRBI which, if true, would give him standing to personally
recover on the corporation's cause of action. 82 In an excellent analysis,
the court explained that when a corporation forfeits its right to sue in
Texas courts due to the failure to pay franchise taxes, the sole shareholder
does not automatically become a successor in interest who may person-
ally recover on the corporation's causes of action. 83 In reviewing JRBI's
situation, the court noted that a corporation that fails to pay its franchise
taxes loses the right-and capacity-to sue in Texas courts.84 This lack of
capacity, however, did not make JRBI's suit void. A lack of capacity
must be challenged by a verified plea in abatement. 85 Although ET did
not directly challenge JRBI's capacity, it had challenged Bacon's right to
individually recover on JRBI's cause of action at trial.86 This was con-
strued by the appellate court as "a challenge to Bacon's standing as an
individual shareholder of an incapacitated, but still existing,
corporation. "87
80. 1995 Tex. App. LEXIS 5 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist] Jan. 5, 1995, no writ) (not
yet released for publication, subject to revision or withdrawal).
81. Id. at *3-*4.
82. Id. at *5-*6.
83. Id. at *6-*10.
84. Id. at *6-*8.
85. 1995 Tex. App. LEXIS 5 at *6.
86. Id. at *7-*8.
87. Id. at *8.
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The court next recognized that when a corporation forfeits its privi-
leges to sue in Texas courts, the title to its assets is bifurcated so that legal
title remains with the corporation while beneficial title vests in the share-
holders. 88 As the holder of beneficial title to JRBI's assets, Bacon was
entitled to prosecute and defend JRBI's actions in Texas courts.89 He did
not have standing to sue in his own name, however, as the court ex-
plained: "Capacity to sue devolves upon the shareholders of a corpora-
tion when that corporation becomes incapacitated. Standing to sue,
however, does not devolve upon the shareholders, and they must sue as
representatives of the corporation, which still owns legal title to its cause
of action." 90 In this situation, Bacon should have sued in JRBI's name on
the corporate cause of action. After reviewing the stages of corporate
decay, the court concluded that neither Bacon nor JRBI had the requisite
combination of standing and capacity that was necessary to pursue the
claim. Judgment was rendered that Bacon take nothing. 91
The court provided a footnote on how Bacon could have successfully
pursued the claim against ET. First, he could have paid the past-due
franchise taxes, along with penalties and interest, and revived JRBI's
charter and right to sue.92 Second, he could have dissolved JRBI, taken
title to its assets and liabilities, and maintained the action in his own
name. 93 Finally, Bacon could have sued ET in a representative capacity
on behalf of JRBI.94 While the court's decision may seem harsh, it is
clear that Texas courts have little sympathy for plaintiffs who fail to ob-
serve basic corporate formalities.
D. CONDUCT OF SHAREHOLDER MEETINGS
In ITC Cellular, Inc. v. Morris,95 the Texarkana Court of Appeals con-
sidered whether proper formalities were followed in the shareholder
meetings of a closely held corporation. ITC Cellular, Inc. ("ITC") was
founded by Walker Morris. Fifty-three percent of its outstanding shares
were held by the Morris Children's Trust, of which Walker Morris served
as trustee. Eighteen percent of the company was later acquired by Fred
and David Neal. The Neals brought a stockholder derivative suit in 1990.
As part of the settlement of the suit, the Neals obtained a proxy to vote
the shares held by the trust. After they gained control of the trust shares,
the Neals appointed themselves as corporate officers. In 1993, Morris
attempted to revoke the proxy in favor of the Neals. Each faction called
a shareholder's meeting at approximately the same time; the Neals set the
annual meeting for January 8, 1994, and Morris scheduled a special meet-
88. Id. at *11.
89. Id.
90. 1995 Tex. App. LEXIS 5 at *11.
91. Id. at *20.
92. Id. at *19 n.10.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. 909 S.W.2d 182 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1995, no writ).
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ing on January 13 for the purpose of electing directors. At the annual
meeting, the Neals voted the trust shares and amended the bylaws to re-
duce the number of directors from two to one. Fred Neal was elected the
sole director and president of ITC, and David Neal was appointed as cor-
porate secretary.
The events of the special meeting on January 13 gave rise to the contro-
versy in this case. When Dallas attorney Jon Sparling attempted to call
the meeting to order, Charles Chapman, ITC's corporate counsel, ob-
jected. Chapman pointed out that Section 2.12 of ITC's bylaws required
that the presiding official at a shareholder's meeting be either the corpo-
rate president or the person elected by a majority of the shares. After
Sparling examined the proxy for the trust shares and determined that a
quorum was present, he called a vote to determine who should preside.
Chapman argued that no vote could be taken because the meeting had
not been properly convened. At that point, Sparling nominated himself
to preside over the meeting. Chapman and the Neals promptly walked
out. Sparling proceeded to conduct the meeting, which resulted in the
removal of the Neals and the election of Morris and his nominee to the
board of directors. ITC sought a declaratory judgment to prohibit Morris
and his nominee from holding themselves out as directors. Morris moved
for summary judgment on the basis that he and his nominee were duly
elected at a valid meeting. The trial court concluded that the meeting was
valid and granted summary judgment for Morris. 96
The Neals appealed the summary judgment. The Texarkana Court of
Appeals compared the facts to those of Duffy v. Loft.97 In Duffy, a cor-
porate president refused to call a vote for the election of a presiding of-
ficer for the meeting, as provided in the bylaws. The shareholders elected
someone other than the president to run the meeting. The Delaware
Chancery Court held that the meeting was valid because the stockholders
had no other choice than to act as they did. The Texarkana court held
that in this case, because Fred Neal failed to take control of the meeting,
it "was not fatal for someone else to temporarily conduct the meeting
until a presiding officer could be elected." 98 The court noted that if Neal
had sought to preside, he would have been entitled to do so unless some-
one else was elected. He could not, however, "thwart the will of the ma-
jority by refusing to allow an election of a new chairperson as provided
for in the bylaws." 99 Because Neal failed to take charge of the meeting,
the court found that the meeting had been properly convened.
The Neals also questioned whether a quorum was present when Morris
and his nominee were elected to the board. The court cited Article 2.28
of the TBCA for the proposition that a quorum is present when a major-
ity of the shares entitled to vote are represented at a meeting in person or
96. Id. at 184.
97. See Duffy v. Loft, 152 A. 849 (Del. 1930).




by proxy, and stated that a quorum attaches when the meeting com-
mences. 100 Further, because both Article 2.28(A) of the TBCA and the
ITC bylaws provide that a quorum is not affected by the withdrawal of
shareholders after a meeting has begun, the court held that the quorum
was not broken by the Neals' departure. 101 Finally, the Neals argued that
a quorum is broken when shareholders have good cause to leave a meet-
ing. The court recognized that if a shareholder is forced to leave a meet-
ing or denied the right to participate, their withdrawal is not voluntary
and a quorum can be broken.102 The court found, however, that although
the Neals were not satisfied with the number of shares they were allowed
to vote, they left the meeting voluntarily. Their voluntary departure
meant that the quorum was not broken. Therefore, the trial court's sum-
mary judgment was affirmed. 10 3
III. LEGISLATIVE HIGHLIGHTS
During the 1995 legislative session, the Texas Business Law Foundation
proposed House Bill 1425,104 which contained numerous amendments to
the Texas corporation, limited liability company, and partnership statutes.
The bill was developed by the Corporation Law Committee of the State
Bar Section of Business Law and was intended to update Texas business
entity laws in order to make the state a more attractive jurisdiction for
incorporation.' 0 5 The bill was passed by the Texas House of Representa-
tives and approved by the Economic Development Committee of the
Texas Senate. Unfortunately, filibusters and a last-minute political
squabble kept the bill from passing the Senate. 0 6 Due to the bill's non-
controversial nature, however, it is expected to pass during the early days
of the 1997 legislative session. A summary of the bill's more significant
provisions is included here as a preview and planning guide for business
lawyers. Caution is encouraged, however, since there is no assurance that
the bill will pass or that it will pass without modification.
One of most interesting features of the bill is its provision for a new
form of corporate transaction known as a conversion. A conversion dif-
fers from a merger in that there is no combination or division of the cor-
poration, but simply a change in organizational form with no interruption
of the organization's existence.' 0 7 The procedures to effect a conversion
are similar to those required for a merger.10 8 Because a conversion rep-
resents only an uninterrupted change in the form of the organization, it
100. Id.; see also TEX. Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. art. 2.28 (Vernon Supp. 1995).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 185-86.
103. 909 S.W.2d at 186.
104. Tex. H.B. 1425, 74th Leg., C.S. (1995).
105. HOUSE COMM. ON BUS. AND INDUSTRY, BILL ANALYSIS, Background, Tex.
C.S.H.B. 1425, 74th Leg., R.S. (1995).
106. Id.




cannot be used in lieu of a merger of two pre-existing operating
entities.' 0 9
A new Part Thirteen is proposed for the TBCA which will impose spe-
cial voting requirements for certain related-party transactions involving
publicly-held Texas corporations and their shareholders. 1 0 This Part will
prohibit self-dealing transactions between the corporation and sharehold-
ers holding more than twenty percent of its shares, for a period of three
years after the shareholder acquired its interest, unless the transaction is
approved by two-thirds of the remaining shareholders."1' The prohibi-
tion will not apply if the board of directors approved the transaction
before the shareholder acquired its interest or if the shareholder held its
interest from a specified date through the date of the transaction. 112 Part
Thirteen also includes a provision expressly permitting directors to "con-
sider the long term interest of a corporation and its shareholders when
considering actions that affect the interest of their corporations." 1 3
If the bill passes in 1997, Part TWo of the TBCA will be amended to
include, among other things, a new Section 2.30-1 dealing with share-
holder agreements. This section will permit the shareholders of a busi-
ness corporation to modify, by agreement, governance provisions such as
the board's discretion and powers, the means for authorizing and making
distributions, and the terms of the directors and officers. 1 4 The section is
based on a similar provision in the Revised Model Business Corporation
Act.115 Article 2.21, dealing with the personal liability of shareholders
and subscribers, will be amended to provide that the affiliates of a share-
holder or subscribers will enjoy the same statutory protection as the
shareholder or subscriber.116 Article 2.29 will be amended to provide
that if a corporation holds shares of its own stock through a trust or
otherwise, the corporation may vote those shares." 7 Article 2.31 will also
be amended to permit a modification to the general rule that a corpora-
tion will be managed by its board of directors."a 8
If passed, the bill will amend Article 3.05 to delete the requirement
that the $1,000 in consideration to be received by the corporation before
it begins to transact business be in the form of money, labor done, or
property received."19 This change results from the elimination of the re-
striction in the Texas Constitution regarding the form of consideration to
be received by Texas corporations prior to first transacting business.' 20
109. Id.
110. Id. § 39.
111. Id.
112. H.B. 1425 § 39.
113. Id.
114. Id. § 8.
115. Id § 8.
116. Id, § 5.
117. H.B. 1425 § 7.
118. Id. § 9.




The change will also conform Article 3.05 to Article 2.16, which allows
consideration consisting of any tangible or intangible benefit. 121 A simi-
lar conforming change will be made to Article 3.02A.122 Finally, Article
5.14 will be amended to provide updated procedures for the disposition
of stockholder derivative actions, including rules for the appointment, by
a court, of a group of disinterested directors or other persons to consider
issues raised in the derivative proceeding. 123 The derivative rules are
based on similar provisions in the Revised Model Business Corporation
Act.124
121. Id.
122. H.B. 1425 § 14.
123. Id § 27.
124. Id
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